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Extradition: Computer Technology and the
Need to Provide Fugitives with
Fourth Amendment Protection in
Section 1983 Actions
I. INTRODUCTION
In April, 1974 Wisconsin police arrested Ronald Maney for a
minor traffic violation. Following standard procedure, the of-
ficers consulted the National Crime Information Center
(NCIC)1 computer to determine whether there were any war-
rants outstanding for Maney's arrest. NCIC computer data re-
vealed that Maney was wanted in Louisiana on a felony charge.
On the basis of that information, Maney was arrested and
forced to spend four weeks in a Wisconsin jail; he was released
after the Louisiana authorities, 2 contrary to their stated inten-
*tion, failed to send the papers necessary for Maney's extradi-
tion.3 In October, 1974 Maney was stopped for a vehicle
1. The National Crime Information Center (NCIC) is a national sys-
tem, managed and operated by the Federal Bureau of Investigation
(FBI) which uses computers and telecommunication technology for
transferring and sharing criminal justice information among federal,
state, and local agencies. The center is physically located in the FBI's
computer facility in Washington, D.C. and includes a telecommunica-
tion network that reaches automated or manual teletype terminals in
all of the 50 States, the District of Columbia, Canada, Puerto Rico, and
some large cities. The service of NCIC is free to the participating
States and the funds for it come from the FBI's authorization.
OFFICE OF TECHNOLOGY ASSESSMENT, A PRELIMINARY ASSESSMENT OF THE NA-
TIONAL CRIME INFORMATION CENTER AND THE COMPUTERIZED CRIMINAL HISTORY
SYSTEM 7 (1978) [hereinafter cited as PRELIMINARY ASSESSMENT]. Authority for
the NCIC program is derived from 28 U.S.C. § 534 (1976).
2. The Louisiana authorities involved were the Chief of Police of Baton
Rouge, Louisiana, a police officer of the Baton Rouge Police Department, the
District Attorney, and an Assistant District Attorney for the East Baton Parish.
See Maney v. Ratcliff, 399 F. Supp. 760, 764-65 (E.D. Wis. 1975).
3. Extradition is the transfer of fugitives between states. Although "ren-
dition" is technically the correct term to describe the interstate transfer of fugi-
tives, and "extradition" is technically the transfer of fugitives between
independent nations, see 2 J. MOORE, A TREATISE ON EXTRADITION AND INTER-
STATE RENDITION 819 (1891); Note, Interstate Rendition and the Fourth Amend-
ment, 24 RUTGERS L. REV. 551, 551 n.1 (1970), this Note will use the term
extradition to refer to rendition because of the common usage of the former by
both laypersons and courts.
A fugitive is a person who has been charged by a state with having commit-
ted a crime, but who is absent from the state. The person need not have fled
the state in order to avoid prosecution; one is a fugitive if one leaves the state,
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registration violation. Because a NCIC computer check re-
vealed that he was still wanted in Louisiana, Maney was again
arrested and forced to spend four weeks in jail; again, he was
released after the Louisiana authorities failed to send the ex-
tradition papers. At a port of entry in New York two months
later, Maney was once more arrested on the basis of the same
NCIC computer information. On this occasion, Maney sought
various types of injunctive relief against the Louisiana authori-
ties, as well as compensatory and punitive damages.4 A federdl
district court denied Maney's request for damages, but issued
an injunction requiring the removal of Maney's "fugitive from
justice" entry in the NCIC computer.5
Maney's experience demonstrates the importance of the
NCIC computer in the current extradition process. It is rou-
tinely used by the police,6 and a fugitive who is arrested on the
basis of information supplied by the NCIC computer is subject
to a number of possible abuses: arrest based on outdated infor-
mation or misidentification; 7 detention in jail until the demand-
ing state informs the asylum state that it has no intention of
seeking the fugitive's extradition;8 repeated arrest and deten-
tion based on the same information supplied by a state with lit-
tle serious desire to extradite the fugitive;9 and extradition
for whatever reason, after being charged with a crime. See generally Biddinger
v. Commissioner of Police, 245 U.S. 128 (1917); Roberts v. Reilly, 116 U.S. 80
(1885); 2 J. MOORE, supraat 887.
4. Maney based his cause of action on 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1976). For further
discussion of this cause of action, see notes 61-64 infra and accompanying text.
5. Maney v. Ratcliff, 399 F. Supp. 760, 773-74 (E.D. Wis. 1975). The court
denied Maney's request for damages, stating that "the remedy does not fully
compensate a plaintiff nor deter future misconduct." Id. at 773. The court ap-
parently felt that an injunction, without damages, was the only proper redress
to offer the plaintiff. For a criticism of the disposition of the case, see note 102
infra and accompanying text.
6. During 1979, police contacted the NCIC twenty-five million times from
their patrol cars to find out, among other things, see note 35 infra, about the
possible fugitive status of persons they had stopped. Telephone conversation
with Gary Boatman, Communications Correspondence Operator, NCIC, Wash-
ington, D.C. (Sept. 22, 1980).
7. See note 108 infra and accompanying text. In his dissenting opinion in
Baker v. McCollan, 443 U.S. 137 (1979), Justice Stevens stated that the risk of
misidentification is substantial when an arrest is made through a computer
check. Id. at 2700 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
8. See Note, Indigents' Right to Appointed Counsel in Interstate Extradi-
tion Proceedings, 28 STN. L. REv. 1039, 1043 (1976).
9. The facts of Maney v. Ratcliff, 399 F. Supp. 760 (E.D. Wis. 1975), see text
accompanying notes 1-5 supra, provide an example of this abuse. The injunc-
tion issued in Maney was limited to the plaintiff's situation, and did not prevent
the similar detention of other fugitives.
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without a judicial determination of probable cause.1 0 Although
no computerized system is perfect, the potential for harm from
inaccurate or incomplete records can only increase as the po-
lice increase their use of and reliance on the NCIC computer."
Today, fugitives who bring state tort actions for false arrest
and imprisonment are not likely to succeed.12 Fugitives may
also bring actions in federal court under section 1983 of the
Civil Rights Act,13 which guards the citizen's federal rights
against infringement by state action,14 but most federal courts
have taken a limited view of the fugitive's federal extradition
rights and have failed to recognize the computer's importance
in the extradition process.' 5 As a result, the federal courts
have failed to provide the fugitive with any meaningful protec-
tion against extradition abuse, and thus, contrary to the pur-
pose of section 1983, have failed to offer effective redress for the
citizen who has suffered from state action.' 6
10. In Gerstein v. Pugh, 420 U.S. 103 (1975), the Supreme Court held that a
judicial determination of probable cause must precede any significant pretrial
restraint of liberty in order to guarantee a proper check upon the functions of
the police. Id. at 117-18. For a definition of probable cause, see W. RINGEL,
SEARCHES & SEIZURES, ARRESTS AND CONFESSIONS § 4.3 (1979). An indictment
and a warrant issued subsequent to a probable cause finding by a judge satis-
fies the fourth amendment requirement of probable cause, see Gerstein v.
Pugh, 420 U.S. 103, 117 n.19 (1975), but an affidavit or information alone does not
because a judge has not made the requisite independent finding of probable
cause. See generally id. at 116-17. The Supreme Court has not yet ruled on
whether a probable cause determination must be made prior to a fugitive's ex-
tradition. See text accompanying notes 103-06 infra.
11. See PRELIMINARY ASSESSMENT, supra note 1, at 3.
12. The police have a good faith defense open to them in a tort action for
false arrest and imprisonment, and the plaintiff is rarely able to overcome that
defense by showing that the police did not act in good faith. See note 16 infra.
13. 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1976). For further discussion of section 1983, see notes
61-64 infra and accompanying text.
14. See note 62 infra.
15. The district court in Maney v. Ratcliff, 399 F. Supp. 760 (E.D. Wis. 1975),
is the only federal court that has explicitly dealt with the problems that com-
puter technology poses for the fugitive, even though according to one author,
computers now form the heart of the extradition process. Note, supra note 8, at
1042.
16. See note 62 infra. For a discussion of what rights the fugitive should
be the accorded, see notes 147-82 infra and accompanying text.
An additional reason for the failure of section 1983 to protect the fugitive
may be that the police (who are the most frequent defendants in section 1983
actions, see W. RINGEL, supra note 10, § 22.4(c) (3)) can assert a good faith de-
fense against the charge of depriving a citizen of federal rights. Id. Due to jury
bias, which is often in favor of the police and against the defendant, see gener-
ally Project, Suing the Police in Federal Court, 88 YALE L.J. 781, 783 (1979), the
plaintiff is often unsuccessful in overcoming the good faith defense of the po-
lice. See Owen v. City of Independence, Mo., 445 U.S. 622, 650-53 (1980).
The effectiveness of section 1983 as a remedy for the fugitive who has suf-
fered extradition abuses may thus remain circumscribed, even if the proposals
1981]
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This Note first examines the federal and state extradition
provisions that relate to fugitives who have been charged with
crimes but who are not already prisoners or parolees.17 The
Note then explores how the extradition process presently
works in those states that have adopted the Uniform Criminal
Extradition Act (UCEA),18 and discusses how the federal
courts have treated the extradition provisions with regard to a
section 1983 cause of action for abuses in this process. Finally,
the Note proposes an outline of the fugitive's extradition rights,
predicated on tle reasonableness clause of the fourth amend-
ment of the United States Constitution.
II. EXTRADITION PROVISIONS
A. FEDERAL CONSTITUTION AND STATUTE
The source of federal extradition procedures is the extradi-
tion clause of the United States Constitution. This brief clause
provides:
A Person charged'in any State with Treason, Felony, or other Crime,
who shall flee from Justice, and be found in another State, shall on De-
mand of the executive Authority of the State from which he fled, be de-
livered up to be removed to the State having Jurisdiction of the
Crime.1 9
in this Note are accepted. See generally text accompanying notes 147-82 infra.
Section 1983 may become a more effective tool for the plaintiff as courts seek to
redress violations of federal rights by limiting the use of the good faith defense.
See, e.g., Owen v. City of Independence, Mo., 445 U.S. 662 (1980).
17. Prisoners, and arguably parolees, are also subject to extradition. Uni-
form Criminal Extradition Act § 5 [hereinafter cited as UCEA], reprinted in 11
UNIFORM LAWS ANNOTATED 51 (1974). This Note, however, will neither address
the procedures for extraditing prisoners and parolees, nor consider the kinds of
protections. they should receive in the process.
18. Only the District of Columbia, Mississippi, and South Carolina have
failed to adopt the UCEA. For a discussion of the extradition practices fol-
lowed in these three jurisdictions, see note 33 infra. Further information con-
cerning the UCEA may be found in notes 31-33, 42-52 infra and accompanying
text.
19. U.S. CONST. art. IV, § 2, cl. 2. The authors of this constitutional provi-
sion were influenced by a federalist philosophy, and thus limited the power of
the states over persons to those within their territories, but recognized the
need for guidelines on the return of fugitives. See Kentucky v. Dennison, 65
U.S. (24 How.) 66, 100 (1860). The extradition clause embodied no new princi-
ple when it was written; it simply prescribed what the courts had been doing
up to and even after the adoption of the Articles of Confederation of 1778. See 2
J. MOORE, supra note 3, at 820-22. The "principle of territorality" is at the core
of the clause: (a) the state sovereign has no power over persons in another
state; (b) the law to be applied is the law where the alleged crime was commit-
ted; (c) the criminal laws of a state are essentially local. See J. MuRPHY, AR-
REST BY POLICE COMPuTER 47-48 (1975).
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The extradition clause is not self-executing: 20 it does not spec-
ify the methods to be followed in recovering the fugitive, nor
the form of the demand for the return of the fugitive. To cor-
rect this deficiency, Congress passed the extradition statute in
1793;21 this statute has remained essentially unchanged.22
20. This problem was noted by Edmund Randolph, Attorney General of
the United States, in a report dated July 20, 1791. The report was presented by
President Washington to Congress for its consideration prior to the passage of
the extradition statute. See J. ScoTT, INTERSTATE REND rON 5-7 (1917).
21. Act of Feb. 12, 1793, ch. 7, 1 Stat. 302 (1793) (current version at 18 U.S.C.
§ 3182 (1976)). It is the view of some federal courts, see notes 65-69 infra and
accompanying text, that the federal statute was primarily intended for the ben-
efit of the states, rather than citizens. This view is untenable, both because it
would make the language in the statute concerning the necessity of producing
an indictment or affidavit superfluous, and because concern had been ex-
pressed before Congress for the protection of innocent persons. See UNITED
STATES CONGRESS, 37 AMERICAN STATE PAPERS 41-42 (Misc. 1834). The purpose
of the statute would be better viewed as striking a balance between state and
private interests.
The federal legislation could, however, be viewed as providing only a mini-
mum standard of cooperation to be followed by the states, precluding any state
from setting extradition standards higher then those contained in the federal
law. According to this theory, the states may enter into agreements providing
for the return of fugitives on less exacting terms than the federal extradition
statute, because the basic goal is the return of the fugitive. See United States
ex rel. Grano v. Anderson, 446 F.2d 272, 278 (3d Cir. 1971) (Van Dusen, J., dis-
senting); J. MuRPHY, supra note 19, at 62-63.
Criticism of this theory comes from an early Supreme Court case discuss-
ing the purpose of the federal requirements:
The Executive authority of the State, therefore, was not authorized by
this article to make the demand [for the party's return] unless the
party was charged in the regular course of judicial proceedings. And it
was equally necessary that the Executive authority of the State upon
which the demand was made, when called on to render his aid, should
be satisfied by competent proof that the party was so charged. This
proceeding, when duly authenticated, is his authority for arresting the
offender.
... [I]f it was left to the States, each State might require different
proof to authenticate the judicial proceeding upon which the demand
was founded .... And this led to the act of 1793, of which we are now
speaking. All difficulty as to the mode of authenticating the judicial
proceeding was removed by the article in the Constitution, which de-
clares, ". . .[that] the Congress may by general laws prescribe the
manner in which acts, records, and proceedings, shall be proved, and
the effect thereof."
Kentucky v. Dennison, 65 U.S. (24 How.) 66, 104-05 (1860).
There is no hint in any of the early cases construing the federal extradition
provisions that Congress merely intended to provide a minimum standard of
state cooperation. Indeed, Justice Taney in Dennison went on to state that
Congress clearly specified the judicial acts which are necessary to authorize
the governor's extradition demand. Id. at 106.
Although the states may not extradite fugitives on less exacting terms than
those required by the extradition statute, the states may nevertheless "fashion
other cooperative arrangements for the effective administration of justice."
New York v. ONeill, 359 U.S. 1, 6 (1959). For example, many states have
adopted, under the express authorization of Congress, 4 U.S.C. § 112(a) (1976),
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The current federal extradition statute23 details the proce-
dure the states are to follow: (1) the governor (executive au-
thority) of the demanding state2 4 presents to the governor of
the asylum state a copy of an indictment or an affidavit made
before a magistrate (and certified as authentic by the governor
or chief magistrate of the demanding state 25 ) charging the per-
son with having committed a crime;26 (2) the governor of the
asylum state arranges for the person to be arrested and de-
tained, and notifies the demanding state of the fugitive's deten-
tion;27 and (3) the person is delivered to the authorized agent
of the demanding state.28 If the agent does not appear within
thirty days from the time of the person's arrest, the person may
be discharged.29
legislation such as the Uniform Act on Fresh Pursuit, the Interstate Agreement
on Detainers, and the Interstate Compact for Parolees and Probationers. See J.
MuRPHY, supra note 19, at 24.
22. The original statute has been modified to include any state or territory
of the United States; also, the time in which the agent must appear has been
reduced from six months to thirty days, and the language concerning costs and
expenses incurred has been dropped. See 18 U.S.C. § 3182 (1976).
23. 18 U.S.C. § 3182 (1976).
24. The state seeking the fugitive's return is the demanding state; the state
detaining the fugitive is the asylum state. See generally 2 J. MOORE, supra note
3.
25. UCEA § 3 also embodies this requirement.
26. When the UCEA was written, the federal statute was not to be
superceded, but rather supplemented; as such, this first requirement of 18
U.S.C. § 3182 appears in UCEA §§ 2, 3. Unlike the federal provisions, however,
the UCEA explicitly provides for the situation where the fugitive is responsible
for the crime but was not in the state at the time of its actual commission. See
UCEA § 6.
Because an affidavit does not require that a neutral judicial officer deter-
mine if there is probable cause to believe that the fugitive committed the crime,
see W. RINGEL, supra note 10, § 4.1(b), the federal statute and the UCEA argua-
bly violate the commands of the fourth amendment by allowing extradition on
the basis of an affidavit. See notes 168-75 infra and accompanying text. By con-
trast, an indictment satisfies the probable cause requirement.
27. UCEA § 2 also embodies this requirement. For a discussion of the rele-
vancy of this provision, see text accompanying notes 98-99 supra.
28. The UCEA refines this requirement by its express allowance to the fu-
gitive of the right to contest his or her extradition by habeas corpus if so de-
sired. See UCEA §§ 10, 25-A.
29. The federal statute does not address the question of what happens to
the fugitive who is not discharged after thirty days. Because the extradition
statute does not use the word "shall" in reference to the fugitive's release, the
states, without directly contradicting the federal extradition requirements,
have allowed the judge to extend the fugitive's detention for another sixty-day
period. See UCEA § 17. For discussion of the difficulties with this practice, see




The federal statute remained the guideline for states in the
area of extradition until the early part of this century, when
state authorities began to realize that the federal statute was
inadequate.30 The statute failed to provide guidelines for the
states in several important areas, including: the method of ar-
rest and detention of the fugitive prior to, and after, the formal
demand for his or her return; the manner of applying for a req-
uisition for the fugitive's return; and, the method of applying
for a writ of habeas corpus. 31 As a result of federal silence in
these areas, many states adopted the UCEA so that uniformity
might be achieved in the extradition of fugitives.
The present UCEA, written in 1936, has been adopted by
fifty-two states and territories. 32 In jurisdictions that have not
adopted the UCEA, the extradition guidelines are not as spe-
cific, 33 and thus the fugitive is subject to greater discretionary
treatment.
IMl. CURRENT EXTRADITION PROCEDURE
UNDER THE UCEA
When a warrant is issued for the arrest of a person charged
with a "felony" or "serious misdemeanor"3 4 and the person
cannot be immediately located by the police, that person's
name is automatically entered in the NCIC computer's
30. See J. MuaRHY, supra note 19, at 55-56.
31. Also covered by the UCEA are: bail; the right to withhold the fugitive's
extradition when criminal prosecution in the asylum state is pending; and the
extradition of a person who, while not physically present in the demanding
state, indirectly caused a crime in that state. See 11 UNIFOxm LAWS ANNOTATED
53 (1978).
32. See note 18 supra.
33. The District of Columbia has the most detailed extradition procedures
of the three jurisdictions that have not adopted the UCEA. Under the extradi-
tion guidelines of the District of Columbia, however, the warrantless arrest and
waiver of extradition provisions are much less specific than the UCEA counter-
parts. See generally D.C. CODE ANN. §§ 23-401 to -411 (1967 & Supp. 1979). The
extradition statutes of Mississippi, Miss. CODE ANN. §§ 99-21-1 to -11 (1972), and
South Carolina, S.C. CODE §§ 17-9-10 to -70 (1976), are silent on all of the areas
that the UCEA was intended to cover, with the exception of bail. The jurisdic-
tions that have not adopted the provisions of the UCEA do, however, use the
NCIC computer as an aide in law enforcement. See note 1 supra.
34. The penal statutes of the jurisdiction entering the fugitive's name with
the NCIC computer will determine whether an act is a felony or a serious mis-
demeanor. See Appendix to Hearings Before the Subcomm. on Admin. Practice
and Procedure of the Senate Comm on the Judiciary, Pt. 3, 95th Cong., 2d Sess.
831 (1979) (hearings on FBI Statutory Charter).
1981]
MINNESOTA LAW REVIEW
"Wanted Persons File."3 5 In some circumstances the police can
enter the person's name without the issuance of a warrant,3 6
and, whether or not there is a warrant, the name will remain
indefinitely in the computer until the agency that entered the
name formally withdraws it.37 In some situations, limitations
on the extradition of the fugitive will be entered in the com-
puter. For example, a county might seek extradition only if the
fugitive is apprehended within a five-state area. More often,
however, the difficulty of forecasting the desired limitations
precludes the entry of such considerations. 38 As a result, the
fugitive can be arrested anywhere in the country on the basis
of the original entry in the NCIC computer. Currently, over
6,000 agencies submit data to the computer.39
35. There are nine different categories of records in the NCIC Computer.
Wanted Person File, Stolen Vehicle File, Stolen License Plate File, Stolen Arti-
cle File, Stolen/Missing Gun File, Securities File, Boat File, Computerized
Criminal History File, and Missing Person File. Id.
There are three categories of wanted persons: (a) a person who is subject
to an arrest warrant in regard to a felony or serious misdemeanor; (b) a person
who has, or is believed to have, committed a felony and who is believed to
have, or will have, crossed the state borders, and circumstances do not permit
the immediate obtainment of a felony warrant; and (c) a person who is subject
to a federal arrest warrant. Id.
36. According to FBI policy on the use of the Wanted Person File, if an
agency desires the return of a fugitive and there is no warrant for his or her
arrest, the agency must indicate upon entering the fugitive's name with the
NCIC computer that it is a 'Temporary Felony Want" and is "subject to verifi-
cation and support by a proper warrant within 48 hours following the initial en-
try of a temporary want." Id. It is the responsibility of the originating agency
to see that this requirement is followed. Id.
37. Id. at 832. All liability for damages resulting from inaccurate informa-
tion rests with the agency that entered the information on the NCIC computer.
Although the officials responsible for the NCIC computer advise the entering
agency to correct errors in the entry of data if they are detected, and have the
authority to cancel the entry if the agency does not comply, see Telephone con-
versation, supra note 6, several problems with inaccurate information remain:
there is no guarantee that errors will be detected, or that detection will occur
within a reasonable time; and errors of omission, such as the failure to provide
complete data, exist. See note 108 infra and accompanying text.
38. See Note, supra note 8, at 1043.
According to MINCIS/NCIC QUALrrY CONTROL AND VAUDATION PROGRAMS
16.3.1 (1979), the "unforeseen circumstances" that make it difficult to forecast
extradition limitations include: distance between the originating agency and
the agency where the fugitive is located, budget limitations, and the degree of
seriousness of the alleged crime. It is debatable, however, just how unforeseen
these circumstances are: a reasonable approximation with respect to the speci-
fied circumstances at the time of record entry seems at least desirable; other-
wise, an agency, using the rationale of unforseen circumstances, could enter
any fugitive's name with the NCIC computer without making the slightest at-
tempt to decide any extradition limitations.
39. See Maney v. Ratcliff, 399 F. Supp. 760, 764 n.1 (E.D. Wis. 1975); PRELIMU-
NARY ASSESSMENT, supra note 1, at 7.
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Police use the NCIC computer as part of their daily rou-
tine, consulting the computer, for example, by entering the li-
cense plate data of the vehicle of a person who has been
detained for a traffic violation.40 In most cases, a computer
check is part of the arrest procedure. If the person is wanted in
another state as a fugitive from justice, the NCIC computer will
register a "hit."41 A police agency satisfied with the accuracy of
the NCIC data will retain custody of the alleged fugitive.
The UCEA requires that the person thus arrested be
brought before a judge or magistrate "with all practicable
speed," and that a "complaint ... be made against him"42
when there is no local arrest warrant.43 If the entering agency
indicates to the arresting agency that it desires the fugitive's
extradition, a "fugitive from justice" complaint is invariably is-
sued.44 The UCEA next requires that the judge or magistrate
determine whether the person being detained is the one
40. Vehicle inquiries increased by over two million from 1978 to 1979 to a
total in 1979 of approximately twenty-five million. See Telephone Conversation,
supra note 6.
41. See Note, supra note 8, at 1042. NCIC policy states that the inquiring
agency "must check with the agency identified as the source of the record to
verify that the warrant is still outstanding and the person inquired upon is
identical with the subject of the warrant, and to obtain extradition informa-
tion." DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE, FBI, EXTRADITION OF WANTED PERSONS AND THE
NATIONAL CRIME INFORMATION CENTER 3 (1979). The effectiveness of this proce-
dure as a method for protecting the fugitive is questionable, however. Even
though the inquiring agency may follow the NCIC policy of checking with the
originating agency, there are no guidelines delineating how the originating
agency should ensure, for example, that the warrant is still outstanding or that
the person arrested is the one who is actually wanted. This problem is com-
pounded because the data in the NCIC computer may be both stale and inaccu-
rate. See note 108 infra and accompanying text. Further, when there is a
question of identification, the originating agency is not always cooperative in
providing additional data. See Note, supra note 8, at 1042-43.
42. UCEA § 14.
43. A warrant is not required for a fugitive's arrest if the crime charged is
punishable by death or imprisonment exceeding one year. See id.
Because of the heavy police use of the NCIC computer, it is no surprise
that a fugitive is usually arrested without a warrant. See Note, supra note 8, at
1044 n.24. The use of computers in the extradition process has so greatly af-
fected the way in which the fugitive is normally extradited that certain federal
and state provisions have become almost anachronistic: the provisions require
that the governor initiate the fugitive's arrest and detention after the extradi-
tion papers arrive, see note 27 supra and accompanying text, but since the pa-
pers normally do not arrive until one month after the fugitive is arrested, see
note 51 infra and accompanying text, this merely leads to the extended deten-
tion of the fugitive.
44. Interview with John Tierney, Assistant Hennepin County Attorney, in
Minneapolis, Minnesota (Dec. 5, 1980). Although no information is available
concerning the practices of other counties in this regard, one may assume that
Hennepin County is not atypical.
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charged with the crime, and whether the person fled from jus-
tice.45 Information from the NCIC computer may be sufficient
to satisfy the judge on the question of identification.46
The judge must inform the alleged fugitive that he or she
may either waive or contest extradition.47 If the fugitive de-
cides to waive extradition, the judge executes the waiver and
no bond is set.4 8 The authorized agents of the demanding state
then take custody of the accused, although the UCEA specifies
no set time in which the agents must take custody.4 9 If the fu-
gitive decides to test the legality of the arrest and extradition,
the fugitive will normally be committed to a county jail until
the demanding state has sent the formal extradition papers for
the fugitive's return.50 The papers usually arrive within thirty
days, but the demanding state is allowed up to ninety days.51
Once the papers arrive, the governor of the asylum state may
issue an extradition warrant 2 to detain the fugitive until trans-
fer to the demanding state.
Once the warrant is issued, the fugitive may submit an ap-
plication for an extradition writ of habeas corpus 53 to challenge
his or her detention. Due to the restricted scope of review in
an extradition habeas corpus proceeding,5 4 the fugitive is often
45. UCEA § 15.
46. See Note, supra note 8, at 1044.
47. See UCEA §§ 10, 25-A.
48. See UCEA § 25-A.
49. See UCEA § 25-A.
50. Although a judge normally sets bail for the fugitive, many fugitives are
indigent and cannot pay. Also, it is not unusual for the judge to set bail at an
amount higher than that which would have been set had the crime been locally
committed. See Note, supra note 8, at 1045.
51. Conley, Clearing the Fog, 4 ORANGE COUNTY B.J. 157, 159 (1977); see
Note, supra note 8, at 1043, 1045.
52. UCEA § 7. If the papers do not arrive, the fugitive must be released.
UCEA §§ 15, 17.
53. Although the relevant federal habeas corpus statutes are found in 28
U.S.C. §§ 2241-2255 (1976), the exact source of the right of the fugitive to apply
for an extradition writ of habeas corpus is unclear. See Crumley v. Snead, 620
F.2d 481, 483 n.7 (5th Cir. 1980). The general purpose of the writ of habeas
corpus is to test the legality of the restraints on liberty. See R. SOKOL, FEDERAL
HABEAS CoRPus 29-30 (1969). See also Note, Development of Federal Habeas
Corpus Since Stone v. Powell, 1979 Wis. I. REv. 1145, 1147-48.
54. The Supreme Court has recently repeated that the scope of review in
an extradition habeas corpus proceeding is limited to a determination of four
items: "(a) whether the extradition documents on their face are in order; (b)
whether the petitioner has been charged with a crime in the demanding state;
(c) whether the petitioner is the person named in the request for extradition;
and (d) whether the petitioner is a fugitive." Michigan v. Doran, 439 U.S. 282,
289 (1978).
It has been at least one writer's opinion that the "laws on extradition
habeas corpus seem to remain one of the strictest, one might say 'old fash-
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unsuccessful in challenging the legality of the detention.55 The
fugitive who fails to obtain an extradition habeas corpus writ
has no other legal recourse; the fugitive is transferred without
further delay to the demanding state. Once in the demanding
state, the fugitive can bring either a section 1983 action 56 or, af-
ter exhaustion of state remedies, a federal writ of habeas
corpus.57
Although many police agencies enter names in the NCIC
computer, they may decline to proceed with the extradition of a
fugitive arrested in another state. Financial considerations and
the likelihood of successful prosecution are major factors in the
decision of whether to proceed with the fugitive's extradition.58
While the fugitive waits in jail, the demanding state may take
up to three weeks before it must inform the authorities in the
asylum state that it does not plan to seek the fugitive's extradi-
tion.59 Even if released as a result of the demanding state's de-
cision not to extradite, the fugitive is subject to possible
rearrest on the basis of the same information in the NCIC com-
puter.60
IV. SECTION 1983 REMEDIES FOR EXTRADITION
ABUSES
A. INTRODUCTION
Once extradited, a fugitive who believes that his or her fed-
eral constitutional or statutory rights have been violated may
seek redress under section 1983.61 In order to maintain a sec-
ioned' areas of the criminal law." Conley, Fighting Extradition: The Venerable
Writ of Habeas Corpus, 4 ORANGE CouNrY B.J. 337, 338 (1977). The ostensible
reason for this strict approach is the concern that extradition be summary and
mandatory. See Michigan v. Doran, 439 U.S. 282, 288-89 (1978). See generally
Pacileo v. Walker, 446 U.S. 1307 (Rehnquist, Circuit Justice, 1980). Adherence
to this belief is strengthened by the policy arguments that habeas corpus
wastes judicial resources and upsets the balance of federalism. See Note, Fed-
eral Habeas Corpus: The Relevance of Petitioner's Innocence, 46 U. Mo.-KAN.
Crry L. REv. 382, 388 (1978). See generally Note, Extradition Habeas Corpus, 74
YALE L.J. 78 (1964).
55. See Conley, supra note 54, at 342.
56. See generally Brown v. Nutsch, 619 F.2d 758 (8th Cir. 1980).
57. See 28 U.S.C. §§ 2241-2255 (1976).
58. See Note, supra note 8, at 1043.
59. Id.
60. See generally notes 1-5 supra and accompanying text.
61. See 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1976). "Prior to his removal to the demanding
state, the charged party can only challenge his confinement by the asylum state
authorities through the writ of habeas corpus. This would require exhaustion
of state remedies. A section 1983 action is not available." Brown v. Nutsch, 619
F.2d 758, 763 (8th Cir. 1980). The writ of habeas corpus and section 1983 are
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tion 1983 cause of action,62 the plaintiff must not only allege
that the defendant acted under color of state authority, but
must also allege a violation of a federal right.63 Whether a fugi-
tive can claim a violation of a federal right for an alleged im-
proper extradition is an issue that has divided the federal
courts.
64
designed to fulill the same purpose, namely, to protect constitutional rights.
The fugitive can only apply for an extradition writ of habeas corpus when held
in the asylum state; when in the demanding state, the fugitive can only bring a
section 1983 action. See Brown v. Nutsch, 619 F.2d 755, 763 (1980); Note, Res
Judicata and Section 1983: The Effect of State Court Judgments on Federal
Civil Rights Actions, 27 U.C.L.A. L. REV. 177, 215-18 (1979).
62. According to a recent pronouncement of the Supreme Court,
[tihe central aim of the Civil Rights Act [i.e., section 1983] was to pro-
vide protection to those persons wronged by the "[m]isuse of power,
possessed by virtue of state law and made possible only because the
wrongdoer is clothed with the authority of state law."
Moreover, [section] 1983 was intended not only to provide compen-
sation to the victims of past abuses, but to serve as a deterrent against
future constitutional deprivations, as well.
Owen v. City of Independence, Mo., 445 U.S. 622, 650-53 (1980) (quoting Monroe
v. Pape, 365 U.S. 167, 184 (1961)).
Just how section 1983 is to compensate the individual for constitutional
deprivations, however, is unclear. In Carey v. Piphus, 435 U.S. 247 (1978), the
Supreme Court held that one cannot recover damages for procedural due pro-
cess violations unless proof of actual harm is shown. Id. at 263-64, 266. Because
Carey did not offer redress for the deprivation of the right itself, it is unclear
how far the Supreme Court will be willing to extend the doctrine that one must
prove damages before one can recover for the deprivation of a constitutional
right. This restriction by the Court on section 1983 actions has been sharply
criticized. See, e.g., Note, Damage Awards for Constitutional Torts: A Recon-
sideration After Carey v. Piphus, 93 HARv. L. REV. 966, 967, 979-85 (1980). See
generally Love, Damages. A Remedy for the Violation of Constitutional Rights,
67 CALIF. L. REV. 1242 (1979); Comment, Carey v. Piphus and Remedying Con-
stitutional Torts, 21 ARuZ. L. REv. 871 (1979).
63. See Scheuer v. Rhodes, 416 U.S. 232, 249-50 (1974) (federal courts must
adopt a liberal attitude toward section 1983 complaints, and must not dismiss a
complaint unless the plaintiff can prove no set of facts in support of the claim
for which relief is sought). The courts generally find that state officials act
under color of law as long as they act with the appearance of authority, even if
the acts are illegal under state law. See generally Monroe v. Pape, 365 U.S. 167
(1961).
64. This has resulted in a number of different, sometimes totally opposite,
positions with regard to extradition. One reason for this is that the Supreme
Court has not dealt squarely with the issue of a fugitive's rights; as a conse-
quence, the federal courts, with only a few related Supreme Court cases from
the turn-of-the century on which to rely, have been free to formulate their own
positions on extradition without feeling compelled to refute the positions
adopted in other circuits.
Another reason for this division lies in the confusion among federal courts
concerning the requirement that the plaintiff additionally allege a violation of a
federal right. Section 1983 provides redress not only for violations of "rights,
privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution," but also for those rights
secured by the "laws." There is difficulty in determining what is meant by the
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B. FEDERAL COURT VIEWS ON THE AvALABmrrY OF SECTION
1983 REMEDIES FOR EXTRADITION ABUSES
1. Federal Extradition Provisions Give No Rights to the
Fugitive
One view taken by federal courts is that the federal extra-
dition clause and statute provide no rights to the fugitive,65 and
that there is thus no possibility of section 1983 relief. The
courts that have adopted this position generally follow the ra-
tionale of Johnson v. Buie.66 The court in Johnson stated that
"the rights granted under the federal provisions for extradition
are granted to the states rather than to the fugitives who might
be the subject of extradition."67 The court suggested that, al-
word "laws," and whether the federal extradition statute falls in this category.
It would seem obvious that there should not be the same remedy for the viola-
tion of every law or statute passed by Congress as there is for the violation of
constitutional rights-not only would the federal courts be swamped with
cases, but Congress could easily encroach upon the power of the states by
passing laws all of which are constitutionally mandated. Indeed, the jurisdic-
tional counterpart of section 1983, 28 U.S.C. 1343 (1978), which gives the federal
courts subject-matter jurisdiction in section 1983 actions, refers to "laws" in re-
lation to the equal rights of the citizens, which arguably delimits the scope of
"laws." See S. NAHMOD, CIVIL RIGHTS & CIvIL LIBERTIES LITIGATION: A GUIDE
TO § 1983, § 2.10 (1979).
Contrary to common sense, however, and emphasizing the "plain lan-
guage" of the statute, the Supreme Court has recently adopted the unqualified
rule that section 1983 encompasses claims based on pure statutory violations of
federal law. See Maine v. Thiboutot, 100 S. Ct. 2502, 2505-06 (1980). The dissent
by Justice Powell emphasizes the extreme consequences of the Court's posi-
tion by a brief examination of the various federal laws section 1983 would apply
to. Id. at 2507-21 (Powell, J., dissenting).
Given the expansive holding in Thiboutot, it is tempting to argue that the
fugitive should now have no difficulty asserting that his federal rights had been
violated in an improper extradition. This argument assumes, though, that the
courts will adhere to the unqualified decision of Thiboutot. Because Congress
has passed so many laws, and because so many statutory laws could provide
the basis for a section 1983 action, it is doubtful that the courts will embrace
Thiboutot wholeheartedly.
65. See Siegel v. Edwards, 566 F.2d 958, 960 (5th Cir. 1978); Adams v. Cuy-
ler, 441 F. Supp. 556, 558 (E.D. Pa. 1977), rev'd on other grounds, 592 F.2d 720 (3d
Cir. 1979), affirmed, 49 U.S.L.W. 4105 (1981); United States ex rel. Bryant v.
Shapp, 423 F. Supp. 471, 475 (D. Del. 1976); Hines v. Guthrey, 342 F. Supp. 594,
596 (W.D. Va. 1972); Johnson v. Buie, 312 F. Supp. 1349, 1350-51 (W.D. Mo. 1970).
See also Sami v. United States, 617 F.2d 755, 774 (D.C. Cir. 1979) (federal provi-
sions on interstate extradition confer no rights on the individual).
' 66. 312 F. Supp. 1349 (W.D. Mo. 1970). The courts that cite Johnson to
reach a similar conclusion often'do so without making any attempt at analyzing
the soundness of the decision. For example, the Court of Appeals for the Fifth
Circuit simply states that "[o]nce a fugitive has been brought within custody of
the demanding state, legality of extradition is no longer proper subject of any
legal attack by him." Siegel v. Edwards, 566 F.2d 958, 960 (5th Cir. 1978) (citing
Johnson v. Buie, 312 F. Supp. 1349, 1351 (W.D. Mo. 1970)).
67. Johnson v. Buie, 312 F. Supp. 1349, 1351 (W.D. Mo. 1970). The court in
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though the fugitive has the right to test the legality of extradi-
tion by means of habeas corpus, the right is severely confined
due to limitations on the type of questions that can be raised
before transfer to the demanding state. 68 Comparing a fugitive
with an incarcerated prisoner, the court contended that a forci-
ble abduction or improper extradition violates no rights of the
fugitive: upon entering the demanding state the fugitive cannot
claim a violation of due process rights so long as he or she re-
ceives a "fair trial."69
The position of the Johnson court and other federal courts
that have adopted a similar view is untenable. An examination
of the federal extradition clause and statute does not support
the view that they were "designed to benefit the states, not to
benefit fugitives";70 rather, these provisions raise the opposite
inference, namely, that certain procedures must be followed
before a person can be extradited, to ensure against arbitrary
state interference with the fugitive's liberty.7 1 The legislative
history of the extradition statute, while limited, confirms that
sufficient care must be provided to protect the rights of individ-
Johnson cites a few related cases to support its assertion. See id. (citing
United States ex rel. Simmons v. Lohman, 228 F.2d 824 (7th Cir. 1955) (states
are not bound by the federal extradition provisions when providing for the re-
turn of fugitives); Woods v. State, 264 Ala. 315, 87 So.2d 633 (1956) (fugitive can
be extradited on less exacting terms than those required by the federal extradi-
tion statute)).
68. 312 F. Supp. at 1351.
69. "[D]ue process of law is satisfied when one present in court is con-
victed of crime after having been fairly apprized [sic] of the charges against
him and after a fair trial in accordance with constitutional procedural safe-
guards." Frisbie v. Collins, 342 U.S. 519, 522 (1952) (quoted in Johnson v. Buie,
312 F. Supp. 1349, 1351 (W.D. Mo. 1970)).
Reliance by the Johnson court on Frisbie is misplaced, however, for a
number of reasons: first, Frisbie did not rule out redress for violations of con-
stitutional rights other than due process; second, Frisbie, if taken literally, re-
quires the person to be convicted before its holding can apply; and, finally,
Frisbie involved an entirely different question, namely, the applicability of the
exclusionary rule in an abduction case once the person has been found guilty.
70. Hines v. Guthrey, 342 F. Supp. 594, 595 (W.D. Va. 1972); Johnson v.
Buie, 312 F. Supp. 1349, 1351 (W.D. Mo. 1970).
71. The argument of defense counsel that the extradition statutes are
based on comity and are solely for the benefit of the states is not wor-
thy of serious notice. The requirement that a person arrested as a fugi-
tive be advised of his right to counsel and be taken before a court
patently benefits the prisoner, not the state.
Sanders v. Conine, 506 F.2d 530, 532 (10th Cir. 1974). Although the court in
Sanders does not make a clear distinction between the state and federal extra-
dition statutes, the logic of the argument is applicable to both-the procedures
the states are to follow are for the fugitive's benefit. See also Pierson v. Grant,




uals. Only upon compliance with certain judicial acts may the
executive branch of government, headed by the governor, ex-
tradite the fugitive.7 2 Support for the view that the fugitive has
no extradition rights cannot be drawn from any Supreme Court
decision relating to extradition.7 3 Even the court in Johnson
recognized that the fugitive has one right, namely, the right to
test the legality of the extradition by means of a writ of habeas
corpus.74 Because the basis of the writ and a section 1983 ac-
tion is the same-to protect one's constitutional rights75-it is
unreasonable to maintain that the ability to seek redress for a
violation of those constitutional rights is lost simply because
one has already been extradited.7 6 The argument that a fair
trial is the adequate remedy for the fugitive who has, for exam-
ple, been forcibly abducted to the demanding state is also with-
out merit. Not only does this remedy fail to make the fugitive
whole in the manner of a damage award, but it also fails to pro-
tect the individual in the asylum state from arbitrary state ac-
tion violative of the fourth amendment.77
2. UCEA Does Not Involve Federal Rights
A second approach used by courts examining the question
of extradition abuse fails to examine the federal provisions and
instead focuses solely on violations of the UCEA. These courts
assert that because the states' procedural safeguards "derive
from state rather than federal law, [section] 1983 does not pro-
72. See note 21 supra.
73. The best attempt at using a Supreme Court case to bolster its argu-
ment that the federal extradition provisions were not to benefit the fugitive can
be found in Hines v. Guthrey, 342 F. Supp. 594 (W.D. Va. 1972). The court in
Hines quotes from Biddinger v. Commissioner of Police, 245 U.S. 128, 133
(1917): the federal extradition provision must be liberally construed to achieve
its important purpose, namely, "to eliminate... the boundaries of States, so
that each may reach out and bring to speedy trial offenders against its laws
from any part of the land." 342 F. Supp. at 595. It is unclear how the Hines
court believes that Biddinger supports the more radical belief that the fugitive
had no rights under the federal guidelines.
74. This right was recognized by the Supreme Court almost 100 years ago
in Roberts v. Reilly, 116 U.S. 80 (1885), although its exact source was not speci-
fied in that case.
75. See note 61 supra.
76. See generally Brown v. Nutsch, 619 F.2d 758 (8th Cir. 1980).
77. See generally notes 117-29 infra and accompanying text. Contrary to
the assertion in Johnson v. Buie, 312 F. Supp. 1349, 1351 (W.D. Mo. 1970), Frisbie
v. Collins, 342 U.S. 519 (1952) does not support the view that a fair trial is the
adequate "remedy" for a forcible abduction. Frisbie instead declares that a
court may take jurisdiction over a case even when the defendant has been ab-
ducted. 342 U.S. at 522-23.
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vide a remedy for their breach."78 Absent conduct by the police
that "shocks the conscience" in violation of fourteenth amend-
ment due process,7 9 the police may forcefully transport a fugi-
tive without creating a remedy for that fugitive under section
1983. This position, it is argued, comports with "modern con-
ceptions of due process." 80
This approach may be criticized for assuming that the fed-
eral extradition provisions are irrelevant simply because the
states have adopted the UCEA. Taken to an absurd extreme,
this view would imply that the states can ignore any act of Con-
gress if they decide to act in the same area, an idea at odds
with the doctrine of federal supremacy. The UCEA did not su-
persede the federal extradition provisions, but rather supple-
mented them.81 A violation of a UCEA rule may also be a
violation of the federal statute, and thus support a section 1983
action for a violation of a federal right.82
Furthermore, the view that the UCEA does not involve fed-
eral rights may be criticized in light of Cuyler v. Adams,83 a re-
cent decision in which the United States Supreme Court held
that the Interstate Detainer Agreement, providing for the tem-
porary return of prisoners to face criminal prosecution in an-
other state, established federal rights that were actionable
under section 1983.84 The rationale of the Cuyler decision,
while expressly limited to the Interstate Detainer Agreement, 85
might be applied to the UCEA: it could be argued that the
UCEA is federal law under the federal Compact Clause 86 be-
cause Congress consented to passage of the UCEA by the
states and because the UCEA covers an area that is appropri-
ate for federal legislation.8 7
78. Raffone v. Sullivan, 436 F. Supp. 939, 941 (D. Conn. 1977); accord, Brown
v. Nutsch, 497 F. Supp. 75, 76 (E.D. Mo. 1979), rev'd on other grounds, 619 F.2d
758 (8th Cir. 1980); Robinson v. Vaclavik, 477 F. Supp. 75, 76 (E.D. Mo. 1979).
79. Raffone v. Sullivan, 436 F. Supp. 939, 941 (D. Conn. 1977).
80. Id.
81. See notes 26-29 supra. See generally text accompanying notes 30-31
supra.
82. For example, both state and federal provisions require the governor of
the demanding state to send an indictment or affidavit to the governor of the
asylum state before the extradition of the fugitive can proceed. See note 26
supra and accompanying text.
83. 101 S. Ct. 703 (1981).
84. Id. at 711.
85. Id. at 708 n.10.
86. U.S. CONsT. art. 1, § 10, cl. 3 provides that "No State shall, without the
consent of Congress ... enter into any Agreement or Compact with another
State."
87. According to Justice Brennan, writing for the majority in Cuyler v. Ad-
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But even if one could successfully argue on the grounds of
Cuyler that the UCEA is federal law and thus is actionable
under section 1983, the fugitive may still be left without ade-
quate protection. The UCEA has not been adopted by all
states, and, even where adopted, the UCEA does not fully pro-
tect the fugitive under the current extradition process. The
UCEA was written long before the widespread use of com-
puters, and therefore does not address problems such as those
that result when a state enters a fugitive's name in the NCIC
computer and later decides not to seek the fugitive's extradi-
tion. Moreover, the constitutional right to be free from unrea-
sonable searches and seizures under the fourth amendment
suggests that even if the UCEA establishes federal rights, these
rights are insufficient. 88
3. Fugitive's Federal Rights Are Limited to Federal
Extradition Provisions
Some federal courts, taking a third view, recognize that the
federal extradition provisions provide a fugitive with federal
rights, and that a person may seek redress for a violation of
those rights under section 1983. There are two subtle variations
of this view, however. In Crumley v. Snead,89 the Court of Ap-
peals for the Fifth Circuit stated that because the fugitive's
right to challenge extradition by a writ of habeas corpus is "se-
cured by the Constitution and laws of the United States,"90 a
denial of that federal right-as through a forcible abduction-
will give rise to a section 1983 cause of action, "for Section 1983
protects all rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the
Constitution and laws of the United States."9 1 Because it is the
federal extradition safeguards that are enforced through a
habeas proceeding,92 the court in Crumley, by guaranteeing the
ams, 101 S. Ct. 703, 707-09 (1981), a state act, as part of an agreement with other
states, becomes federal law if it meets two requirements of the Compact
Clause of the United States Constitution, art. 1, § 10, cl. 3. According to the dis-
senting opinion of Justice Rehnquist, however, the requirements for a state
agreement to come under the Compact Clause are slightly different: only when
a state agreement "requires" the consent of Congress does the agreement fall
under the Compaqt Clause-in other words, the state legislation must encroach
upon or interfere with the supremacy of the United States, not simply be a
matter of federal interest. 101 S. Ct. at 714 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting). It is
questionable if the UCEA meets the standard set forth by the dissent.
88. See notes 117-82 infra and accompanying text.
89. 620 F.2d 481 (5th Cir. 1980).
90. Id. at 483.
91. Id. (emphasis in original).
92. See notes 54, 61 supra.
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availability of a habeas hearing, indirectly guaranteed fugitives
the protection of their rights as provided by the federal extradi-
tion provisions.
In Brown v. Nutsch,93 the Court of Appeals for the Eighth
Circuit advanced the second variation of the view that recog-
nizes federal extradition rights for fugitives under the federal
extradition statute. Despite the availability of a habeas corpus
proceeding, the court argued that all federal extradition provi-
sions provide a fugitive with rights enforceable under section
1983.94 The court in Brown noted the similarity between
habeas corpus and section 1983, and remarked that the fugi-
tive's right to contest the legality of the extradition is compel-
ling when the fugitive has had absolutely no judicial review
prior to the transfer to the demanding state.95 The court fur-
ther noted that a violation of a state statute will give rise to a
section 1983 cause of action only insofar as the requirements of
the federal extradition clause or statute are also violated.96
While courts using both variations of this third view pro-
vide the fugitive with some federal extradition rights, they do
not as a practical matter afford the fugitive any more meaning-
ful rights than the courts that either fail to recognize any rights
for the fugitive under the various extradition provisions or that
view such rights as arising solely from state provisions. The
federal statute, written in the latter part of the eighteenth cen-
tury, is silent on several vital points such as the method of ar-
rest and detention of the fugitive prior to the formal demand
for his or her return to the demanding state.97 Moreover, the
federal statute was not designed to approach problems result-
ing from the current reliance on computers in the extradition
process. The statute anticipates that the fugitive will not be ar-
rested and detained until after the governor of the asylum state
has received the requisite papers and has issued an extradition
warrant.98 Reliance on the NCIC computer, however, results in
the fugitive's arrest and detention prior to the issuance of an
93. 619 F.2d 758 (8th Cir. 1980); see McBride v. Soos, 594 F.2d 610 (7th Cir.
1979); Wirth v. Surles, 562 F.2d 319 (4th Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 435 U.S. 933
(1978); Sanders v. Conine, 506 F.2d 530 (10th Cir. 1974).
94. The emphasis in this variation is not on whether the habeas hearing
was denied or not, but rather on whether the extradition provisions have been
violated.
95. 619 F.2d at 764.
96. Id. at 764 n.8.
97. This was the reason for the creation of the UCEA. See notes 30-31
supra and accompanying text.
98. See text accompanying notes 24-27 supra.
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extradition warrant.99 As a result of the inadequacies of the
federal statute, the courts need to look elsewhere, particularly
toward the fourth amendment, in order to provide the fugitive
with meaningful federal rights.
4. Fugitive Has a Federal Right to be Free from Arbitrary and
Unreasonable Interference
The federal district court opinion in Maney v. RatclifflOO
provides still another view of a fugitive's rights. Unlike the pre-
vious three approaches, the approach taken in Maney was di-
rected toward the rights of fugitives who have never been
extradited to the demanding state. The court stated that re-
peated arrests without subsequent prosecution violate the
fourth amendment right to be free from arbitrary and unrea-
sonable police interference. 101 This application of the fourth
amendment to the area of extradition, while fairly novel for the
federal courts, rests on the assumption that there is no reason
to exclude such an application simply because an arrest and
detention is incident to a possible transfer to another state.
The court in Maney did not attempt to support this assump-
tion, but simply required that the demanding state authorities
remove the fugitive's name from the NCIC computer because it
was clear that they did not intend to extradite the fugitive.
The approach of the court in Maney, while laudable for rec-
ognizing the applicability of the fourth amendment, fails to go
far enough. By only granting an injunction-and then only af-
ter repeated arrests-the court did not focus on the detention
of the fugitive in jail, but rather on the fugitive's right to be free
from "arbitrary" interference. This approach offers the plaintiff
no redress for the hardships suffered while detained,102 and
does not specify the point at which interference becomes "ar-
bitrary." In addition, the injunctive relief given to the plaintiff
99. See note 43 supra.
100. 399 F. Supp. 760 (E.D. Wis. 1975).
101. Id. at 773. The fugitive-plaintiff in Maney had been arrested three
times and had spent more than two months in jail without the demanding state
taking any action toward his extradition. Id. at 774.
102. Cf. Owen v. City of Independence, Mo., 445 U.S. 622, 651 (1980) ("A
damages remedy against the offending party is a vital component of any
scheme for vindicating cherished constitutional guarantees . . . ."). See also
Gomez v. Toledo, 100 S. Ct. 1920, 1923 (1980). The Supreme Court in Owen went
on to note that the absence of a damages remedy could result in a lack of in-
centive both for the aggrieved individual to seek redress for constitutional dep-




provides scant deterrence with respect to similar conduct by
the state authorities.
Since 1975, when Maney was decided, the United States
Supreme Court has had opportunities to clarify the applicabil-
ity of the fourth amendment to extradition cases, but it has
thus far refused to provide the lower federal courts with appro-
priate guidance. The majority in Michigan v. Doran,10 3 a 1978
Supreme Court decision, avoided the fourth amendment issue
in its holding that the courts of an asylum state may not review
a demanding state's judicial determination of probable
cause.104 The Court based its decision on early Supreme Court
cases that held that extradition must, be kept summary and
mandatory in order to effect its purpose; judicial review in the
asylum state is now limited to the consideration of a narrow
scope of issues in an extradition habeas corpus proceeding.1 0 5
In his concurring opinion, however, Justice Blackmun chided
the Court for not deciding whether the fourth amendment re-
quires a probable cause determination. He argued that the ear-
lier decisions were premised on assumptions that were no
longer valid in light of the extension of the fourth amendment
to the states.106
103. 439 U.S. 282 (1978).
104. Id. at 290. The Court felt that it was unnecessary to determine whether
the fourth amendment required a probable cause determination since the de-
manding state had already made a judicial finding of probable cause. Id. at 285
n.3. For criticism of the Doran case, see generally Note, The Extradition
Clause: Asylum From the Warrant Requirements of the Fourth Amendment, 16
Hous. L. REv. 975 (1979); Note, Criminal Law: Probable Cause-A New Stan-
dard, 18 WASHBURN L.J. 643 (1979).
In Zambito v. Blair, 610 F.2d 1192 (4th Cir. 1979), the Court of Appeals for
the Fourth Circuit recognized that a probable cause determination must be
made in the demanding state prior to extradition under the fourth amendment.
The Zambito decision, though, is deficient in two respects: (a) the court did
not believe that the extradition papers must state that a probable cause finding
has been made; (b) the court ignored the significant pretrial confinement a fu-
gitive may face prior to extradition. In Zambito, the plaintiff was arrested on
August 14, 1978, but the asylum state court did not learn until January 18, 1979
that a probable cause determination had been made by the demanding state.
Although the plaintiff had been free on bail during that time, the court ignored
the implications for the indigent fugitive-if the plaintiff in Zambito could not
have afforded bail, there is no indication that the court would have offered re-
dress to the plaintiff for the time spent in jail waiting for evidence to arrive in-
dicating that a probable cause finding had been made. Given the relative ease
with which the demanding state can attach an affidavit stating that a finding of
probable cause has been made, the court in Zambito was clearly wrong when it
declared that it 'Is the actual fact [of a probable cause determination], not the
statement or lack of a statement that, in the end, matters." Id. at 1196.
105. 439 U.S. at 288-89.
106. Id. at 290-94 & nn.1-2 (Blackmun, J., concurring).
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C. THE FAILURE OF THE FEDERAL COURTS TO PROVIDE
FuGTVEs wrrH MEANINGFUL RIGHTS
Many of the abuses associated with extradition result from
judicial insensitivity to the extensive use of computers in the
extradition process. 107 In a society that values freedom, it is es-
sential that any computer information used as the basis for an
arrest be accurate. The Federal Bureau of Investigation has ac-
knowledged, however, that "the data verification and certifica-
tion procedures employed by NCIC do not prevent 'at least
some stale and incorrect data from being in NCIC at any given
time.' "108 The fugitive may thus be subject to arrest and de-
tention on the basis of inaccurate identification or a stale war-
rant. In addition, the fugitive may wait in jail two to three
weeks before the demanding state informs the asylum state
that it has no intention of seeking his or her extradition;109
even when released, the fugitive has no guarantee that he or
she will not be arrested again on the basis of the same informa-
tion in the NCIC computer."]0 Under current practice, the fugi-
tive does not even have the assurance, prior to extradition, that
a probable cause determination has been made-a determina-
tion that is required in all non-extradition arrests.",
By failing to provide a meaningful remedy in this context,
the federal courts exacerbate the abuses suffered by a fugitive.
A fugitive who believes that his or her rights were violated in
an improper extradition can bring an action for false arrest and
imprisonment in a state court, but due to the good faith de-
fense available to the state authorities involved, and the possi-
ble bias of the state court in favor of its own criminal justice
system, the fugitive is not likely to succeed." 2 The fugitive can
107. See notes 6, 15-16 supra and accompanying text.
108. Federal Bureau of Investigation, FBI* Statutory Charter-Appendix
Part 3, at 710 (1979). This comment by the FBI was made in response to a re-
port by the Task Force on Science and Technology in the Criminal Justice Sys-
tem of the Scientists' Institute for Public Information. The report was critical
of the data verification procedures used in NCIC. The FBI went on to say that
the "question becomes one of how much effort can be reasonably expended on
data validation." Id.
109. See text accompanying note 59 supra.
110. See generally text accompanying notes 1-5 supra.
111. See note 10 supra.
112. See note 16 supra. It is also possible that a fugitive might bring an ac-
tion against the officials of the asylum state under section 11 of the UCEA,
which makes it a misdemeanor for the state official to violate section 10 of the
UCEA. Section 10 requires that the person arrested on the basis of the extradi-
tion warrant be taken before a judge or a court of record of the asylum state
before the person can be delivered to the agents of the demanding state. There
is, however, almost no history of litigation under section 11, and it is doubtful
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bring a section 1983 action in federal court, but currently the
federal courts either deny the fugitive all rights or allow the fu-
gitive only certain rights predicated on state law or an inade-
quate federal statute.113 Although one federal court has
recognized a constitutional basis for a fugitive's rights, its rem-
edy for the violation of those rights was limited to that of
preventing further, undefined, arbitrary interference.114
Section 1983 remains a method for remedying extradition
abuses, notwithstanding the actions taken in this area by the
federal courts. This section was intended by Congress to pro-
tect the constitutional rights of citizens and to limit the power
of the states over citizens. Because Congress apparently is re-
luctant or unable to remedy the abuses of extradition suffered
by fugitives,115 the federal courts should utilize section 1983 to
enforce the fugitive's fourth amendment rights and thereby
prevent these abuses.116
that section 11 would significantly benefit the fugitive. First, it is not clear
whether section 11 covers arrests without a warrant. Second, many of the
states that have adopted this penalty provision vary the standard of conduct for
punishment-many states require "wilfull disobedience." Third, and most im-
portant, the fugitive can receive no redress for damages under section 11.
113. See text accompanying notes 65-106 supra.
114. See text accompanying notes 100-02 supra.
115. Congress has not acted in the area of extradition in any substantial de-
gree since the passage of the federal extradition statute in 1793. When that
statute proved inadequate, Congress left it up to the states to rectify the situa-
tion through the creation of the UCEA. The reason for Congressional silence in
this area may lie in the decentralized nature of the United States' criminal jus-
tice system. As a result of decentralization, "[alttempts at comprehensive Fed-
eral legislation to control the collection and dissemination of criminal justice
information have failed to produce legislation or a consensus as to how author-
ity for this important area of control of the system should be allocated between
the States and the Federal Government." PRELIMINARY ASSESSMENT, supra
note 1, at 3.
116. Although one may argue that the federal courts should wait until Con-
gress enacts laws to specifically deal with extradition abuses, the courts would
be ill-advised to adopt such a course. Not only is it doubtful that Congress will
act, but the courts would be abrogating the clear duty they have to enforce and
define a citizen's constitutional rights. See Morrissey v. Brewer, 408 U.S. 471
(1972) (Court specified minimum parole revocation procedures required by the
Constitution). Cf. Mitchum v. Foster, 407 U.S. 225, 242 (1972) (federal courts are
the guardians of the people's rights). But cf. Stone v. Powell, 428 U.S. 465, 493
n.35 (1976) ("Despite differences in institutional environment and the unsym-
pathetic attitude to federal constitutional claims of some state judges in years
past, we are unwilling to assume that there now exists a general lack of appro-




V. PROPOSED FOURTH AMENDMENT
EXTRADITION RIGHTS
A. INTRODUCTION
The fourth amendment provides in part that "[t]he right of
the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and ef-
fects, against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be
violated, and no Warrants shall issue, but upon probable
cause.""n7 The first clause, the reasonableness clause of the
fourth amendment, requires a balancing test to determine the
constitutional rights of the individual.118 Although no precise
or quantitative balance is possible, the initial scope of the
fourth amendment's mandates may be determined by weighing
the individual's liberty interest against the state and federal in-
terests in the action under question.
The protections of the fourth amendment against unrea-
sonable searches and seizures, applicable to the states through
the fourteenth amendment," 9 extend to the full range of crimi-
nal procedures, including not only the arrest of an individuall20
but also his or her brief detention.121 Extradition, involving
both the arrest and detention of an individual for a period of up
to three months, 2 2 should be considered within the scope of
117. U.S. CONST. amend. IV.
118. See, e.g., Delaware v. Prouse, 440 U.S. 648, 654 (1979).
The fourth amendment has two principal clauses: the reasonableness and
the warrant clause. The Supreme Court, in search and seizure cases, vascil-
lates between these two clauses without any consistent analysis. For example,
the Court in Delaware v. Prouse, 440 U.S. 648 (1979), stated that the "essential
purpose of the proscriptions in the Fourth Amendment is to impose a standard
of 'reasonableness' upon the exercise of discretion by government officials." Id.
at 653-54. This was more emphatically stated by the dissenting opinion of Jus-
tice White in Payton v. New York, 445 U.S. 573 (1980): "Our cases establish that
the ultimate test under the Fourth Amendment is one of 'reasonableness.' "
Id. at 620 (White, J., dissenting). The opposite approach was taken by the
Court in Arkansas v. Sanders, 442 U.S. 753 (1979), when it declared that the
"mere reasonableness of a search, assessed in the light of the surrounding cir-
cumstances, is not a substitute for the judicial warrant required under the
Fourth Amendment." Id. at 758.
119. See Payton v. New York, 445 U.S. 573, 576 (1980), for a recent reaffrma-
tion of the holding, first espoused in Wolf v. Colorado, 338 U.S. 25 (1949), that
the fourth amendment applies to the state via the fourteenth amendment.
120. An arrest is "quintessentially a seizure." 445 U.S. at 585 (quoting
United States v. Watson, 423 U.S. 411, 428 (1976) (Powell, J., concurring)).
121. '"The Fourth Amendment applies to all seizures of the person, includ-
ing seizures that involve only a brief detention short of traditional arrest."
United States v. Brignoni-Ponce, 422 U.S. 873, 878 (1975); see Delaware v.
Prouse, 440 U.S. 648, 653 (1979); United States v. Martinez-Fuerte, 428 U.S. 543,
556-58 (1976); Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 16 (1968).
122. See note 51 supra and accompanying text.
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the amendment.123 On their face, the extradition clause and
the fourth amendment are not in conflict, and there is no other
apparent reason to deny application of the fourth amendment
to extradition. 124 On the contrary, as Justice Blackmun stated
in his concurring opinion in Michigan v. Doran, "[t]he words of
the Amendment provide no grounds for a distinction between
'seizures' of persons for extradition and seizures of persons for
any other purpose."'125 Furthermore, the interest to be pro-
tected by the fourth amendment-the "security of one's privacy
against arbitrary intrusion by the police" 2 --is present with
greater force in the extradition context than in many other ar-
rest situations. Since extended detention and forced transpor-
tation between states imposes a restraint -on liberty that is
often far greater than detention within a single state,127 the fu-
gitive facing extradition deserves the protection of the fourth
amendment.12 8
123. 'The extradition process involves an 'extended restraint of liberty fol-
lowing arrest' even more severe than that accompanying detention within a sin-
gle State.... It surely is a 'significant restraint on liberty.' " Michigan v.
Doran, 439 U.S. 282, 296 (1978) (Blackmun, J., concurring).
124. See id. at 294 n.5.
125. Id. at 295 (Blackmun, J., concurring).
126. Wolf v. Colorado, 338 U.S. 25, 27 (1949).
127. Michigan v. Doran, 439 U.S. 282, 296 (1978) (Blackmun, J., concurring).
128. Dicta in several other Supreme Court decisions may be viewed as pro-
viding added support for the proposition that one can use the fourth amend-
ment to define the fugitive's rights, i.e., to provide the fugitive with procedural
safeguards. For example, the Supreme Court stated in Delaware v. Prouse, 440
U.S. 648, 654 (1979) that the '"permissibility of a particular law enforcement
practice is judged" by the fourth amendment. This statement implies that, in
addition to proscribing certain practices, the fourth amendment can also be
used prescriptively. Cf. Michigan v. Doran, 439 U.S. 282, 293 (1978) ("But one
really cannot know whether the Fourth Amendment was satisfied without ex-
amining and determining the procedural protections the Amendment provides
.... ") (Blackmun, J., concurring); Gerstein v. Pugh, 420 U.S. 103, 111 (1975)
("Both the standards and procedures for arrest and detention have been de-
rived from the Fourth Amendment and its common-law antecedents.").
One may argue, however, that it is wrong to use the fourth amendment to
define the fugitive's rights, even though the fourth amendment is made applica-
ble to the states through the fourteenth amendment. The due process clause of
the fourteenth amendment, which limits state action, has two aspects: proce-
dural and substantive. Because procedural due process has been defined as
setting the conditions "which must attach to deprivatory governmental action,"
see Saphire, Specjfying the Due Process Values: Toward a More Responsive Ap-
proach to Procedural Protection, 127 U. PA. L. REV. 111, 113 nn.9-10 (1978), one
may argue that any extradition safeguards which could be specified are prop-
erly classified as procedural due process protections. See Carey v. Piphus, 435
U.S. 247 (1978) (discussed in note 62 supra), concerning the burden of proof
placed on the plaintiff if this argument is accepted.
The above argument is specious, however, because the Court has normally
defined procedural due process to apply to situations when the person has
been deprived of a liberty interest such as the right to attend school, or to hold
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Thus far, no federal court has taken full advantage of Jus-
tice Blackmun's lead in Michigan v. Doran12 9 to rule on
whether the fourth amendment's protection extends to the fu-
gitive. Nevertheless, the federal courts' duty to protect the con-
stitutional rights of citizens can be fulfilled only by recognizing
the applicability of the fourth amendment in this context, and
then determining the extent to which its aegis covers the fugi-
tive.
Under a fourth amendment analysis, the fugitive's liberty
interests should be balanced against the state and federal in-
terests in extradition. In the extradition context, the fugitive's
liberty interest is great-the individual's innocence must be as-
sumed at the pretrial stage.130 This liberty interest is greater
than, for example, a parolee's conditional liberty interest.131 A
fugitive subject to pretrial confinement suffers not only loss of
freedom of movement, but also separation from family and
friends, plus negative repercussions on present or future em-
ployment. 32 Because extradition may involve either transfer
a job. See generally Owen v. City of Independence, Mo., 445 U.S. 622 (1980).
The liberty interest of a fugitive is different than those addressed in the above
cases, however, because the right to remain free is basic to a free society. In-
deed, the Supreme Court has emphatically declared that the "Fourth and Four-
teenth Amendments' prohibition of searches and seizures that are not
supported by some objective justification governs all seizures of the person, 'in-
cluding seizures that involve only a brief detention short of traditional ar-
rest.' " Reid v. Georgia, 100 S. Ct. 2752, 2753 (1980) (citations omitted).
It is interesting to note that the Supreme Court uses a balancing test to de-
termine both a person's procedural due process rights (see, e.g., Morrissey v.
Brewer, 408 U.S. 471, 482-84 (1972)) and a person's "substantive" due process
rights-such as the fourth amendment right to a probable cause determination
(see note 118 supra and accompanying text). The use of the same test under-
scores that the dividing line between the two types of due process is blurred.
See Saphire, supra, at 123.
129. See notes 103-06 supra and accompanying text.
130. There is current confusion over "assumption of innocence" versus
'"presumption of innocence": the latter phrase has been held not to apply to
the pretrial stage because it is really a rule of evidence that allocates the bur-
den of proof at a criminal trial. See generally Fox, The "Presumption of Inno-
cence" as Constitutional Doctrine, 28 CATH. U.L. REV. 253 (1979). But see
Gerstein v. Pugh, 420 U.S. 103, 127 (1974) (Stewart, J., concurring); Thaler, Pun-
ishing the Innocent: the Need for Due Process and the Presumption of lnnocence
Prior to Trial, 1978 Wis. L. REv. 441, 463.
131. A parolee's interest is conditional, and therefore less, in the sense that
a prisoner's early release may be reasonably conditioned upon the observance
of certain rules. Even though the parolee's interest is less, he or she is still
given procedural protection, albeit under the procedural due process clause of
the fourteenth amendment. See Morrissey v. Brewer, 408 U.S. 471, 482 (1972).
132. Other harmful effects include: an erosion of the belief that the criminal
justice system is fair, exposure to jail conditions worse than those encountered
in penal institutions for those convicted, and an increased likelihood of convic-
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to a distant state or significant pretrial confinement, or both,133
the requirement that any interference with the fugitive's liberty
interest be "reasonable" should be recognized by any society
that purports to be civilized and democratic.134
The state's interest in extradition is ancillary to its "duty to
control crime":135 as part of the state's overall concern for its
criminal justice system, the state has an interest in preventing
other states from operating as asylums for fugitives. 36 It is
with this view in mind that the United States Supreme Court
has repeatedly emphasized that extradition should not be bur-
dened with difficult and costly procedures that may greatly re-
tard the effectiveness of a state's criminal justice system.13 7
The federal interest in extradition includes both the need
to preserve harmony among the states,138 and the concern that
the federal government should not unduly interfere in state
matters. 39 On the other hand, the overriding federal interest is
to safeguard the dignity of the individual140 the priority as-
signed to this interest is necessary in a democratic society. The
dignity of the individual is assured through the constitutional
limitations on a state's criminal procedures. Through fair and
reasonable treatment, society promotes the continued coopera-
tion of the citizen with society, which in turn promotes the
smooth functioning of democratic institutions.141 It is the duty
tion as a result of continued confinement. See generally Project, supra note 16,
at 781.
133. See notes 49-59 supra and accompanying text.
134. See Wolf v. Colorado, 338 U.S. 25, 27-28 (1949).
135. Gerstein v. Pugh, 420 U.S. 103, 112 (1974).
136. See, e.g., Michigan v. Doran, 439 U.S. 282, 287 (1978).
137. Id. at 288. Note that the Supreme Court cites in support of the proposi-
tion a case decided before the fourth amendment was held applicable to the
states. See id. (citing Biddinger v. Commissioner of Police, 245 U.S. 128, 132
(1917)).
138. See notes 19, 21 supra.
139. Related to this concern has been the reluctance of the federal courts to
give section 1983 an overly liberal interpretation -not only would state inde-
pendence suffer, but the federal courts' caseload would be overstrained. In
1979, private plaintiffs commenced 23,000 private civil rights actions in federal
court. This represented about 14.7% of the civil caseload. Note, Derivative Im-
munity: An Unjustifiable Bar to Section 1983 Actions, 1980 DuKE I.J. 568, 574
n.39. This concern for the federal courts' caseload, however, may not be highly
significant in light of the Supreme Court's recent broadening of section 1983 to
include violations of any federal statute. See note 64 supra.
140. "A democratic society, in which respect for the dignity of all men is
central, naturally guards against the misuse of the law enforcement process."
Gerstein v. Pugh, 420 U.S. 103, 118 (1975).
141. Arbitrary or unjust treatment of even the fugitive who is later found to
be guilty of a crime is against the state's interests because the possibility of re-
incorporating the fugitive into society as a productive citizen decreases as the
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of the courts, within whose province the constitutional limita-
tions on state action are interpreted and applied, to assure the
just treatment of the fugitive. The Supreme Court has not hesi-
tated to interpret the Constitution to provide safeguards to the
parolee when the denial of his or her conditional liberty is in-
volved.142 In the case of the fugitive who is arguably innocent
of any crime, it cannot seriously be entertained that the courts
overstep their authority when they define safeguards for the fu-
gitive.
In light of the varied and competing individual, state, and
federal interests in the extradition process, no absolute defini-
tion of the rights of the fugitive can be derived-reasonable-
ness is an "amorphous" standard.143 Fear of imprecision,
however, does not excuse the courts from the task of defining
the fugitive's rights, which would in effect deny the fugitive the
protection offered by the fourth amendment. A "common-
sense" approach to the problem is the only solution:144 any ar-
gument that effective extradition will suffer if certain safe-
guards are constitutionally mandated should be viewed "With
skepticism."' 45
B. PROPOSED EXTRADITION RIGHTS UNDER
THE FOURTH AMENDMENT
Upon a balancing of the various interests involved in the
extradition context, a fugitive's rights under the reasonable-
ness clause of the fourth amendment should include: the right
to the procedural safeguards of the extradition process, the
right not to be detained in the absence of a continuing intent to
fugitive's cause for animosity increases. See Morrissey v. Brewer, 408 U.S. 471,
484 (1972).
142. See id.
143. See Payton v. New York, 445 U.S. 573, 600 (1980).
144. This point may be debated in light of Justice White's analysis in his
dissenting opinion in Payton v. New York. See generally id. at 1389-97 (White,
J., dissenting). Justice White believes that reasonableness should be deter-
mined by what was reasonable at the time of the adoption of the fourth amend-
ment. See id. at 1393 (White, J., dissenting). Aside from the difficulty of a
historical search for reasonableness, such an approach freezes the develop-
ment of constitutional law-a result that can only have deleterious effects in a
rapidly changing society.
145. Cf. id. at 1388 ("In the absence of any evidence that effective law en-
forcement has suffered in those States that already have such a requirement
... we are inclined to view such arguments with skepticism. More fundamen-
tally, however, such arguments of policy must give way to a constitutional com-
mand that we consider to be unequivocal."). Payton was a fourth amendment
case that dealt with, among other things, a warrantless and nonconsensual en-
try into a suspect's house in order to make an arrest.
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extradite, the right to an initial appearance and a preliminary
examination before a judge, the right to a probable cause deter-
mination, and the right not to be detained more than thirty
days if the extradition papers do not arrive.
1. Right to the Procedural Safeguards of the Extradition
Process
As mentioned earlier, 4 6 some federal courts provide no
remedies to the fugitive who has been forcibly abducted by the
police from one state to another, arguing, for example, that the
fugitive possesses no right to the extradition process. 47 The
fugitive who is abducted to a distant state may suffer not only
severe psychological effects, due to a sudden separation from
family, friends, and familiar surroundings (in addition to the
possibly rough treatment by the abductors), but also serious
economic consequences-the fugitive may lose income from his
or her job, the chance of promotion, and the right to the job
itself. The citizen should, therefore, have a right not to be
transferred to a distant state in the absence of procedural safe-
guards. This right is supported on grounds of fairness to the fu-
gitive, and also because it would be difficult to argue that state
interests suffer by according the fugitive basic procedural
rights. Evidence that the state's interest would not appreciably
suffer can be inferred from the number of states that have
adopted the detailed requirements of the UCEA, despite any
deleterious effect on the state's interest. 48 The procedural
safeguards that should accompany this right to the extradition
process should include in general the provisions of the UCEA,
and in particular the procedures proposed in the discussion
that follows.149
146. See notes 65-77 supra and accompanying text.
147. See, e.g., Johnson v. Buie, 312 F. Supp. 1349 (W.D. Mo. 1970).
148. The latest state to adopt the UCEA provisions was North Dakota in
1979. See N.D. CENT. CODE §§ 29-30.2-01 to -29 (Supp. 1979).
149. The rights to counsel, to a speedy trial, and to bail, are not explored in
depth in this Note because these rights are specifically guaranteed in other
parts of the federal Constitution. See generally NAT'L ASS'N OF PRETRIAL SERV-
ICES AGENCIES, PRETRIAL RELEASE (1978).
The right to the procedural safeguards of the extradition process has a pos-
sible caveat: the reasonableness of the right to extradition changes when one
considers the situation of a metropolitan area divided by an invisible state line.
The burden on the liberty interest of a fugitive is less when the fugitive is
transferred from one state to another within the same metropolitan area; the
fugitive arguably suffers no more than in an intrastate arrest situation. See J.
Murphy, supra note 19, at 78-81. Moreover, the state's interests in the speedy
retrieval of the fugitive are greater in the metropolitan situation. Because ap-
proximately one fourth of the nation's population lives in metropolitan areas
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2. Right Not to be Detained in the Absence of a Continuing
Intent to Extradite
Currently, a state can enter a person's name in the NCIC
computer without intending to seek that person's extradi-
tion.150 The fugitive may wait in jail two to three weeks before
the asylum state is informed that the demanding state does not
intend to seek the fugitive's return. 51 Even if the demanding
state tells the asylum state that it intends to seek the fugitive's
extradition, there is no guarantee that the demanding state will
keep its promise. In Maney, for example, the plaintiff waited in
jail a month while the asylum state waited for the promised ex-
tradition papers from the demanding state. 5 2 The fugitive may
spend time waiting in jail for extradition papers that will never
arrive, and has no guarantee that, if released because the pa-
pers do not arrive,15 3 he or she will not be arrested again on the
basis of the same data in the NCIC computer.154
A fugitive who has been subject to any of the above abuses
should be allowed to bring a section 1983 action against the au-
thorities of the demanding state. Although it may be argued
that the state authorities will carry an intolerable burden, the
burden is only imaginary. State officials must only act in a rea-
sonable fashion along the lines of current NCIC policies, which
provide that an agency is only supposed to enter or keep a per-
divided by state lines, id. at 21, a state's criminal justice goals may be easily
frustrated by a fugitive who takes advantage of state boundaries. If the fugitive
in the same metropolitan area, but within another state, must always be ac-
corded full extradition procedures, then the state's criminal justice interest
may be impeded before the fugitive is available for the first step in the de-
manding state's criminal justice process, at least nine agencies from both the
demanding and asylum states must become involved. See id. at 21 note e; Mur-
phy, Uniform Criminal Extradition Act: Time for Change?, in THE HANDBOOK
ON INTERSTATE CRIME CONTROLS 95 (1978). Requiring the states always to set
the entire extradition process in motion places a needless burden on them. On
the other hand, there may be extradition situations which, while occurring in a
metropolitan area, mandate that the fugitive be given full extradition rights.
What the situations are-when the extradition safeguards may be ignored and
when they may be not-cannot be readily specified, however, because what is
reasonable will vary with the facts. There is the problem of defining what a
metropolitan area is, and of exposing the police to such a vague standard that
they will never know in advance of litigation when it is "reasonable" to dis-
pense with the extradition process. Because of these problems, the full expli-
cation of the caveat to the right, to the extradition process may be best left to
the legislature to decide.
150. See notes 1-5 supra and accompanying text.
151. See note 59 supra and accompanying text.
152. Maney v. Ratcliff, 399 F. Supp. 760, 764 (E.D. Wis. 1975).
153. See note 52 supra.
154. See generally Maney v. Ratcliff 399 F. Supp. 760 (E.D. Wis. 1975).
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son's name in the NCIC computer if it maintains a firm commit-
ment to gaining the extradition of that person.' 55 The right not
to be detained in the absence of an intent to extradite will not
only protect the significant liberty interest of the fugitive, but
will also advance the state and federal interest in avoiding the
harassment or unjustified detention of its citizens.156
Thus, a state agency should be required to determine
whether extradition will be pursued before it can enter a per-
son's name in the NCIC computer. The county prosecutor who
normally makes the decision whether to pursue extradition
should be required to use specific guidelines before entering a
person's name with the NCIC. Guidelines might include con-
sideration of, for example, the seriousness of the alleged crime,
the financial limitations on the extradition of the fugitive over a
great distance, and the length of time during which the agency
will seek extradition. 5 7 Owing to practical limitations, it is not
always possible for the prosecutor to determine, at the time the
warrant is first issued, that the fugitive's extradition will defi-
nitely be sought. Once it is determined that the fugitive will
not be extradited, however, the fugitive's name should be de-
leted from the NCIC computer.158 If the demanding state has
been informed that the fugitive has been detained, it should
immediately determine whether it still desires extradition. If
extradition is not sought, steps should be taken to ensure that
the fugitive will not be arrested and detained again.159 In addi-
tion, to avoid the detention of the wrong person, the originating
agency should be held to a standard of reasonable assurance
that the information supplied to the NCIC computer concern-
ing the fugitive's identity is both accurate and sufficient to per-
mit positive identification of the fugitive by the police in the
asylum state.
155. See generally DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE, FBI, EXTRADITION OF WANTED
PERSONS AND THE NATIONAL CRIME INFORMATION CENTER (1979). The courts
have a duty to provide the proper stimulus to ensure that the state authorities
adhere to the NCIC policy of using the NCIC computer only if there is a firm
commitment to gaining the fugitive's extradition. Cf. Gerstein v. Pugh, 420 U.S.
103, 117-18 (1975) (in our democracy there must be a series of checks and bal-
ances-law enforcement cannot be entrusted to a single functionary).
156. See text accompanying notes 141-42 supra.
157. These considerations are included to prevent a person's name from re-
maining indefinitely in the NCIC computer.
158. This requirement can be found in the NCIC policy document, EXTRADI-
TION OF WANTED PERSONS AND THE NATIONAL CRIME INFORMATION CENTER,
supra note 155, at 2.
159. This is also a current policy of the NCIC. See id. at 4.
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3. Right to an Initial Appearance and a Preliminary
Examination
Although the extradition statutes of the states that have
adopted the UCEA require that the person being detained be
brought before a judge or magistrate to determine whether the
person is the one charged with the crime, and whether the per-
son fled from justice in the demanding state,160 the extradition
statutes of at least one state do not have a provision for a pre-
liminary hearing.161 Even in the states that have adopted the
UCEA, there is no assurance that there will be adequate identi-
fication procedures at the preliminary hearing. A judge may be
disposed, for example, to accept the information entered in the
NCIC computer as conclusive on the issue of identification,
even though the information is incomplete or inaccurate. 16
2 On
the basis of such inaccurate data, the fugitive can be held in jail
for up to a month or more.
163
Given the grave consequences for the fugitive if the arrest
is based on faulty computer data, courts should recognize that
the fourth amendment requires that the fugitive be allowed an
initial appearance and a preliminary examination to insure that
his or her detention comports with reasonableness. In a non-
extradition arrest, the person who is arrested is accorded cer-
tain procedural safeguards, designed to ensure both that there
is good reason to detain the person and that the person thus
detained is aware of his or her rights. 164 Because the fugitive's
liberty interest is at least as great as that of the person arrested
in a non-extradition situation, the safeguards available to the
latter person should also be made available to the fugitive. Any
additional burden imposed on the states by affording the fugi-
tive certain pretrial procedures should be viewed as minimal,
because almost identical procedural protections are offered at a
later stage in the fugitive's extradition.1
65
160. See note 45 supra and accompanying text.
161. See S.C. CODE § 17-9-10. In Mississippi, the judge determines whether
there is "reasonable cause to believe that the complaint is true." MIss. CODE
ANN. § 99-21-3 (1972).
162. See note 46 supra and accompanying text.
163. See text accompanying notes 50-52 supra.
164. FED. R. CaM. P. 5; see id. 5.1.
165. See notes 53-54 supra.
Although the preliminary examination would probable reduce the utility of
the writ of habeas corpus, because most of the issues raised in the habeas pro-
ceeding would already have been settled, this may be a desirable result. See,
e.g., Murphy, supra note 149, at 105-06. The fugitive needs the protections at an
earlier stage in detention, rather than after being held for one to three months
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Thus, when arrested in the asylum state, the fugitive
should be taken without undue delay before a judge to be in-
formed of the complaint against him or her (the reason for de-
tention), of the right to retain counsel (or to be assigned
counsel if indigent), of the right to remain silent, and of the
right to a preliminary examination. The preliminary examina-
tion, if not waived by the fugitive, should be held not later than
ten days following the initial appearance before the judge if the
fugitive is in custody, or not later than twenty days if the fugi-
tive is not in custody.166 At the preliminary examination, the
fugitive should be allowed to have the issues of identification
and probable cause 167 settled.
4. Right to a Probable Cause Determination
Currently, a fugitive can be extradited without having been
allowed the basic fourth amendment right to a judicial determi-
nation of probable cause.168 As noted earlier, the majority in
Michigan v. Doran chose not to clarify the right of the fugitive
in this regard. There is no guarantee that a probable cause de-
termination has been made when an agency enters a person's
name in the NCIC computer.169 Similarly, there is no require-
ment that a probable cause determination be made in the de-
manding state prior to the fugitive's transfer from the asylum
state. 7 0 It is anomalous that, despite the hardships a fugitive
can suffer from pretrial detention or from transfer to a distant
state, and despite the Supreme Court's decision in Gerstein v.
Pugh171 that a significant pretrial restraint on liberty must be
based on a judicial determination of probable cause, the fugi-
tive today still is not assured the right to a probable cause find-
ing.
The probable cause finding is necessary in order to ensure
that the fugitive is not being held arbitrarily. Even though the
in jail. It is questionable whether the writ of habeas corpus has any real use-
fulness today other than as a tactic for delay. See Conley, supra note 54, at 341.
166. See FED. R. Cmi. P. 5(c).
167. See notes 168-75 infra and accompanying text.
168. See note 10 supra. See also Murphy, supra note 149, at 109-11.
169. An agency is only supposed to enter a person's name in the NCIC com-
puter if there is a warrant for his or her arrest, or if the agency will procure a
warrant within forty-eight hours after the entry. See J. MURPHY, supra note 19,
at 94 n.15. There is no guarantee that the agencies will comply with this re-
quirement, however, or that a fugitive will currently be able to seek redress.
170. See Murphy, supra note 149, at 101-03; note 104 supra.
171. 420 U.S. 103 (1975). The Court in Gerstein held that the Florida proce-
dures, whereby a person could be arrested and detained in jail simply on a
prosecutor's assessment of probable cause, were unconstitutional.
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burden on the state may be increased by requiring, for exam-
ple, that no fugitive entry be kept in the NCIC computer with-
out a probable cause finding, the burden would not be
unreasonable in light of the harsh consequences to the fugitive
arrested, detained, and transferred to another state on the ba-
sis of information in the computer. The requirement that the
demanding state obtain a probable cause finding early in the
extradition process not only affords the judges of the asylum
state a quick and easy means of assurance that there is just
cause to detain the fugitive, but has the added advantage of
promoting state comity. The Supreme Court's decision in Mich-
igan v. Doran,7 2 requiring that the judge of the asylum state
simply accept the judicial determination of the state where the
alleged crime was committed, aids in preserving the integrity of
each state's judicial system-the very purpose of the extradi-
tion process. 173
Application of the reasonableness clause of the fourth
amendment, then, dictates that a: neutral judicial officer in the
demanding state make a probable cause determination before
an entry is made in the NCIC computer for the fugitive's arrest,
or in a reasonable time thereafter. 7 4 Moreover, the demanding
state should forward evidence that a probable cause determina-
tion has been made, by sending an indictment, a warrant, or a
certified copy thereof to the asylum state as soon as possible
after the demanding state is notified of the fugitive's deten-
tion. 7 5 Presented at the preliminary hearing, such evidence of
a probable cause finding would be sufficient to justify the de-
tention of the fugitive.
5. Right Not to be Detained More than Thirty Days If the
Extradition Papers Have Not Arrived in the
Asylum State
A fugitive who decides to oppose his or her extradition may
wait in jail for up to ninety days before he or she can submit an
application for a writ of habeas corpus. 7 6 The fugitive is thus
172. 439 U.S. 282 (1978); see notes 103-06 supra.
173. See notes 19, 21 supra.
174. What is reasonable will, of course, vary with the circumstances of each
specific situation, although one may assume that a forty-eight hour period is
presumptively reasonable. See note 36 supra.
175. An indictment satisfies the probable cause requirement because it rep-
resents a grand jury's determination that it is more probable than not than the
person committed the alleged crime. See Michigan v. Doran, 439 U.S. 282, 295
n.6 (1978) (Blackmun, J., concurring).
176. See notes 50-53 supra and accompanying text.
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faced with a difficult choice when told by the judge in the asy-
lum state that he or she can either waive or contest extradi-
tion: 7 7 the fugitive may consent to transfer to another state if
extradition is waived, or the fugitive may wait in jail for a pro-
longed time before the legality of the detention can be tested.
The fugitive's decision to test the legality of detention through
habeas corpus in effect punishes the fugitive for asserting con-
stitutional rights.178
The reasonableness requirement of the fourth amendment
suggests that the fugitive should only be required to wait in jail
a minimal time before he or she can apply for a writ of habeas
corpus. The demanding state should, therefore, be required to
make its best efforts to send the extradition papers to the asy-
lum state so that the fugitive can submit a habeas corpus appli-
cation. Although it would not be practical to mandate that the
demanding state be held to an inflexibly short time period in
which the extradition papers must be sent, it is not reasonable
to allow the demanding state a period of two to three months to
send papers from one state to another while a fugitive may be
waiting in jail.
Therefore, because it normally takes the demanding state
thirty days before it can prepare and send the extradition
papers to the asylum state, 79 and because a fugitive cannot ap-
ply for a writ of habeas corpus until the extradition papers
177. See note 47 supra and accompanying text.
178. "Punishment" is technically only imposed after a finding of guilt has
been made. See Bell v. Wolfish, 441 U.S. 520, 535 n.16 (1979). Punishment, how-
ever, may also be used in the behavioral sense of negative reinforcement, i.e.,
when its imposition has the effect of decreasing or inhibiting a certain set of
behavioral responses. In the extradition context, the fact that the fugitive may
have to wait in jail for up to ninety days before he or she can bring a writ of
habeas corpus will have the probable effect of decreasing the likelihood that
the fugitive will choose the option of contesting extradition. The Supreme
Court's obliviousness to the practical effects of imposing certain conditions on
the person detained before trial has been seriously questioned. See generally
Comment, "Hands-Off' the House of Detention: Pretrial Detainees and the Illu-
sion of Innocence, 49 U. CIN. I REV. 462 (1980); Comment, Bell v. Wolfish: A
Balk at Constitutional Protections for Pretrial Detainees, 48 U. Mo.-KAN. Crri
U REV. 466 (1980).
179. It is unclear why it normally takes at least thirty days for the extradi-
tion papers to be sent to the asylum state, but according to one source it nor-
mally takes the county prosecutor a week, once it is decided to extradite the
fugitive, before all the required papers can be prepared and sent to the attor-
ney general of the demanding state. Conversation with John Tierney, Assistant
Hennepin County Attorney, Minneapolis, Minnesota (Dec. 5, 1980). The delay
must usually occur, then, from the time it reaches the attorney general to the
time it is attested to by the Secretary of State, and the only excuse appears to
be a lack of time.
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arrive, 180 it would be reasonable to require the release of the
fugitive thirty days after arrest if the extradition papers have
not arrived.181 Contrary to current practice,18 2 the detention of
the fugitive beyond thirty days in order to await the arrival of
the extradition papers should not be granted in the absence of
extenuating circumstances.
VI. CONCLUSION
The federal courts have almost uniformly ignored the im-
portance of computers in the extradition process as well as the
practical workings of the process itself. The widespread and
routine use of data in the NCIC computer to arrest and detain
fugitives has increased the number of cases in which fugitives
suffer unreasonable restraints on their liberty. In section 1983
actions for improper extradition, however, the federal courts
have focused mainly on the federal extradition provisions or on
the UCEA, and as a result have been consistent only in their
failure to provide the fugitive with meaningful rights. By giving
scant attention to the constitutional rights of the fugitive, the
federal courts have abrogated their special duty to protect the
person facing extradition from arbitrary state interference with
his or her liberty.183
The reasonableness clause of the fourth amendment pro-
vides a source for the fugitive's extradition rights. By defining
the rights that inhere under the fourth amendment in section
1983 actions, the courts will not only be able to provide the pro-
spective relief of injunctions, but also the compensatory and
deterrent benefits of a damage award.' 84 "In a country like
180. See text accompanying note 53 supra.
181. This thirty-day period should begin from the time the demanding state
is informed of the fugitive's detention in the asylum state, which should be as
soon as practicable after the fugitive is arrested.
The right to be released after thirty days is based on the assumption that
the courts will continue to use the extradition writ of habeas corpus. For dis-
cussion of whether the courts should continue this practice, see notes 54, 165
supra. If the courts no longer use the extradition writ of habeas corpus, the
focus of this right would change from the right to be released within thirty days
if the extradition papers do not arrive to the right not to be confined in the asy-
lum state more than thirty days absent transfer to the demanding state.
182. See Note, supra note 8, at 1043 n.21.
183. See notes 62, 63, 116 supra.
184. The issues of the timing of section 1983 actions and the choice between
injunctive and compensatory relief are beyond the scope of this Note, although
it is clear that during the period of detention in the asylum state the fugitive
cannot bring a section 1983 action-the only available remedy is an extradition
writ of habeas corpus. See note 61 supra. Further, it is apparent that once the
fugitive is extradited the abstention doctrine of Younger v. Harris, 401 U.S. 37
1981]
MINNESOTA LAW REVIEW
ours [the] power [to extradite] is useful and indispensable. It
was intended, however, to subserve great public interests.
When otherwise used it becomes an evil."185
(1971), would prohibit certain relief. For example, an action for an injunction
under section 1983 to restrain a pending criminal prosecution in the demanding
state would violate the policies of Younger.
185. See J. MOORE, supra note 3, at 1057 (quoting Compton v. Wilder, 40
Ohio St. 130 (1883)) (the Supreme Court of Ohio made this comment in a case
holding that it is legal to commence a civil suit against one who has been extra-
dited).
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